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Abstract 
 
After 40 years of oil investments, the UK is now a mature oil province. During these 
40 years or so, the UK Government has changed the type of governance it uses to 
manage its petroleum resources. This paper introduces the theoretical background to 
two models of mineral resource governance: the so-called proprietorial and non-
proprietorial regimes. It investigates the adoption of these two models by the UK 
Government and their effect on the overall tax take from the UK`s petroleum resources. 
The analysis tracks the changes in the UK petroleum taxation system since 
establishment up until 2010. It assesses how these tax changes have affected the overall 
petroleum marginal tax rate. The study concludes that the UK Government adopted a 
proprietorial type of mineral governance during the period 1975-1982, before changing 
to a non-proprietorial regime in the period 1983-2000. Since 2000 it has begun to move 
back towards a proprietorial style of governance. This change is still in its early stages, 
however; the evidence shows that although there has been an increase in fiscal 
revenues, this increase has been small. 
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Introduction 
 
The mineral resources of any country are part of its national wealth, and the way in 
which these resources are managed can have a significant impact on its prosperity and 
economic development (Boadway and Keen, 2010: 13). The form of governance 
adopted will dictate how access to, control of and benefits from these resources are 
managed. In developing partnerships with international extractive companies, mineral 
rich countries seek agreements that will secure reasonable returns to them. This debate 
is not new; Hotelling (1931: 139) asks: “How much of the proceeds of a mine should 
be reckoned as income, and how much as return on capital”. Mineral rich governments 
may have an incentive to offer relatively generous treatment to extractive companies at 
the planning stage of mining projects, but they are likely to be much less generous once 
production starts. We might infer that governments incentivise new projects and new 
entrants with reduced tax rates in order to harvest a higher tax take when production 
promises significant quantities (Boadway and Keen, 2010). However, this treatment 
may deter those investors who have long term strategies. To avoid this, some 
governments have been designed their tax regimes in such a way as to target the 
economic rent, rather than the gross income, of oil and gas companies operating in their 
areas. 
 
Over the last 40 years or so, the UK has developed into one of the world’s major oil 
production countries.i Successive administrations have developed a fiscal regime using 
the concession model. The main objective of the Government`s fiscal regime has been 
to provide tax incentives to oil and gas companies to explore and develop the UK oil 
and gas reserves while at the same time securing an appropriate share of these resources 
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for the nation. Fiscal policy has sought to remain flexible enough to cope with changes 
in oil prices but at the same time provide the industry with the necessary stability for 
future planning.  
 
From the introduction of the first duty (royalty) on UK oil and gas production in 1964, 
up until 2010, four special taxes were levied alongside the standard Ring-fenced 
Corporation Tax (RFCT). These taxes were: Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), 
Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD), Advance Petroleum Revenue Tax (APRT) and 
the Supplementary Charge (SC). Removing the PRT, SPD and APRT duties weakened 
the UK petroleum fiscal regime in terms of governmental tax take and the balance 
between the state and oil companies (Abdo, 2008; 2010b; HMRC, 2010). However, the 
introduction of the SC in 2002, and the two increases in its rate – in 2006 and in 2011 
– have gone some way to re-strengthening the UK petroleum fiscal system. This shift 
in the UK petroleum fiscal regime reflects a general shift in the governance of the UK`s 
mineral resources.  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine to what extent the introduction of the SC rate 
and its subsequent increases – and indeed any other changes to the UK petroleum fiscal 
regime – have changed the way the UK`s petroleum resources are governed. It also 
aims to identify whether these changes have allowed the UK Government to collect 
higher tax revenues off these resources compared with the pre-2000 period. In other 
words, this paper will try to answer the question of how effective the post 2000 changes 
to the UK petroleum taxation system have been in increasing the Government`s tax take 
from its petroleum resources and in maintaining incentives for investment in the UK 
Continental Shelf (UKCS). Do these changes to the petroleum fiscal regime mirror a 
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change in the type of governance being employed to manage the UK`s petroleum 
resources? Answering these questions will help us arrive at an overall evaluation of the 
UK`s petroleum taxation policy and how useful changing the type of governance has 
been over the life of the UK`s commercial oil and gas investments. The following 
section discusses the various types of mineral governance.  
Governance of Mineral Resources 
Historically, mineral rich countries have used different tools and approaches to govern 
the extraction of their mineral resources. One of these tools was the contract, which has 
taken different forms and structures. The starting point was a ‘concession’ system 
where international operators exercised complete freedom in terms of investments and 
production. Then, in the 1950s, a new form of contract came into existence: the 
production sharing agreement (PSA). In this arrangement, the home government joined 
forces with a national oil company (NOC). NOCs were used to place tight direct control 
on national mineral resources. These companies were established with a number of 
objectives in mind, but primarily to reduce dependency on international companies for 
energy supply, and to help home governments to build up the knowledge and 
experience to develop their own mineral resources. NOCs therefore played a key role 
in negotiating new and existing contracts with international companies (Grayson, 
1981). 
 
In the early 1970s, North Sea oil was formally designated a national asset of the UK 
and the Government asserted ownership of North Sea oil and gas resources. The debate 
at the time was whether control of the extraction and disposal of petroleum resources 
would be better handled by the state or left to oil companies (Cameron, 1983: 42-45). 
In the event, the Government, although adopting the concession system, exercised 
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control over mineral resource extraction and disposal using a range of tools such as the 
fiscal regime and licencing systems.  
 
Cameron (1983) argues that there are two forms of state governance when it comes to 
mineral resources: socialist and nationalist. Mommer (2002) later used different terms 
to express the same meaning: proprietorial and non-proprietorial. Mommer (2002) 
differentiated between private and public ownership and the governance of mineral 
resources. Whilst historically the British coal industry provides a good example of 
private mineral governance when the mineral rights remain in individual ownership, oil 
industries, apart from some exceptions in the US, are usually examples of public 
mineral governance. Yet Mommer (2002: 230) argues that “the controversy that may 
surround public mineral governance is not about public vs. private but non-
proprietorial vs. proprietorial governance and fiscal regimes”. For the purpose of this 
paper the author has accepted Mommer’s more sophisticated differentiation. The 
characteristics of these two regimes are described below.  
   
2.1. Proprietorial Regime   
Under this type of governance, access to land or sea is only granted if the expected 
profits and fiscal revenues are considered satisfactory by both investors and the owners 
of the mineral resources. The main concern of the proprietor is not to allow free access 
to his land/sea. Royalties are an essential tool within this regime; this is to prevent a 
unit of production being lifted without ground rent being paid. Both sides understand 
that these royalties add to the producers` operating costs, putting additional pressure on 
the producing companies; this may restrict production and keep prices high. Thus, 
under this type of mineral governance the mineral resource owner shares with the 
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producer the risk associated with the price, but not that associated with the profit. In 
Wälde`s (2003) view, the proprietorial regime allows mineral owners to dispose of their 
resources as they see fit, and to secure the maximum possible payment for granting 
companies access. Furthermore, this model allows mineral owners to make their own 
decisions regarding the development and exploitation of resources and to deploy tools 
that will allow the maximum rent. Different devices may be used for collecting ground 
rent to secure a higher take at each level of the investment process. These might include 
higher royalty rates, higher income taxes and excess-profit taxes. The key aim of the 
proprietor is to collect a significant rent for every unit lifted, with the usual focus being 
on levies on gross income.  
 
2.2.  Non-Proprietorial Regime  
Governments may see themselves as merely the administrators of their country`s 
natural resources, taking the view that these resources are public goods and a free gift 
of nature to producers and consumers alike. Overtaxing and restricting the exploitation 
of mineral resources risks reducing the investment activities which generate tax benefits 
for both a mineral rich government and its citizens. Mineral rich countries taking this 
attitude generally operate a non-proprietorial type of governance. This type of 
governance allows extraction companies relatively easy access to mineral resources. It 
is usually associated with a legal regime that weakens the strength of ownership over 
subsurface minerals in favour of extractive companies. The central concern in this 
model is the profitability of investment; this type of governance relies on a fiscal regime 
based on the taxation of excess profit, rather than gross income (as under the 
proprietorial governance regime). In this type of governance, there is usually no 
requirement for a customary ground rent. However, it is not unreasonable to expect 
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high excess-profit tax rates to suffer the same fate as high income tax rates and to settle, 
in the long run, at relatively modest effective levels. Non-proprietorial regimes are 
found in countries using concession type agreements; these grant international 
companies carte blanche when it comes to the amount and timing of investments and 
extraction. Overall, non-proprietorial fiscal regimes are not very efficient at collecting 
rent; it follows that bonuses are rarely used in this regime (Mommer, 2002: 88-95).  
 
In the non-proprietorial model, the landlord – the state – grants his tenant – the oil and 
gas company – access to his land and/or sea for free (or free in practice) and his target 
will be the tenant`s economic rent. Of course, access is granted through a licensing 
agency, which regulates the granting of licences to tenants according to certain criteria 
fixed by the agency itself (Abdo, 2006; 2008). The landlord`s aims in allowing free 
access to his land might be to attract tenants to invest, benefiting both the private 
investor and the consumer, and at the same time to develop any marginal resources that 
could exist in his land or sea. The emphasis in this type of governance is on not leaving 
a unit of production in the ground as long as it is profitable to extract it, even if the rent 
the unit attracts falls to zero (Rutledge and Wright, 2010). The decision to adopt a non-
proprietorial regime may sometimes be driven by social and strategic factors such as 
economic growth, inflation and unemployment.  
Historical Evolution of the UKCS Petroleum Fiscal Regime  
The historical evolution of the UK petroleum taxation system has been well described 
in a number of studies, for example Abdo (2006; 2010b), Nakhleh (2008), HMRC 
(2010) and Usenmez (2010). However, it may be beneficial here to outline the historical 
evolution of this regime up to 2010, focusing on the consequences of the changes in the 
marginal tax rate. This should allow us to trace, from the tax changes and other 
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indicators, how governance of the UK petroleum fiscal regime shifted between the 
proprietorial and non-proprietorial models. 
 
From its inception, in 1964, until the early 1980s, the UK’s petroleum fiscal regime 
was proprietorial in nature. Between 1983 and 2002, however, it could be described as 
non-proprietorial. This is because the fiscal regime underwent three relaxations in 
petroleum tax in this period – in 1983, 1987-88, and 1993. These relaxations were 
designed to stimulate investment in new, smaller and marginal fields, although they 
were in fact largely unnecessary (Abdo, 2009; 2010a).  
 
3.1. The Period up to 2000 
Following the commercial discoveries of oil and gas in the UK North Sea, the tax 
regime tightened steadily as the UK got to grips with its newly discovered hydrocarbon 
riches and the implications which they might have for government revenues. The 
starting point, in 1964, was to claim a 12.5% royalty. But it soon became apparent, 
particularly after the dramatic increase in oil prices in 1973, that this was too weak an 
instrument with which to claim a fair share of the rapidly escalating oil revenues for 
UK citizens. In 1975, therefore, a new tax, Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), a tax on 
cash flow, was chosen as the preferred instrument for claiming the Government’s share 
of oil rent.  On the 1st January, 1976 the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) was 
created to represent the state in the oil and gas industry and to secure national ownership 
of produced oil and gas. Tax avoidance was also curtailed by ring fencing field 
operations for tax purposes. Subsequently, there were substantial increases in PRT up 
to a peak of 75% in 1982. A Supplementary Petroleum Duty had been introduced by 
the first Thatcher government the previous year in response to dramatically high oil 
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prices, but this was dropped in 1982 in favour of a higher basic rate of PRT and the 
introduction of Advanced PRT, in order to accelerate revenue collection. The Thatcher 
government also disposed of the BNOC to the private sector, having declared their 
intentions in the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Bill on 17th December, 1981. Taking into 
account the 12.5% royalty, PRT at 45 % and RFCT at 52 %, the marginal tax rate was 
76.9 % for PRT-paying fields, and 58 % for fields not paying PRT.ii 
  
In 1979 the rate of PRT was increased from 45% to 60 % (Great Britain, 1975); by so 
doing, the Government increased its marginal tax take rate from its petroleum resources 
from 76.9% to 83.2% (58% for non-PRT-paying fields). UK petroleum taxation 
escalated further in 1980, when the rate of PRT was increased to 70% (Great Britain, 
1980, S.104), raising the government`s marginal tax rate from 83.2% to 87.4% (58% 
for non-PRT-paying fields). 
 
Following the substantial increase in oil prices in 1979/80, the 1981 Budget introduced 
a new tax called Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD), at a rate of 20% (Great Britain, 
1981, S. 122: 5). With the introduction of SPD, there was thus a combination of taxes 
on oil and gas production during the period 1980-1981, and UK North Sea oil taxation 
became extremely complex and unstable. The instability of the petroleum fiscal regime 
arose from the fact that there were nine major changes over the period 1975-1982.iii  It 
was so complex because of multiple applications and exemptions; four separate taxes 
were being levied simultaneously: royalties at 12.5%, Petroleum Revenue Tax at 70 %, 
Supplementary Petroleum Duty at 20%, and Corporation Tax at 52%. This combination 
of taxes meant that, over this period, the UK government received a total marginal tax 
take of 89.9%  of the final revenues (output) of UK oil and gas resources (66.4% from 
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non-PRT-paying fields).iv On 31st December, 1982, the rate of PRT was further 
increased to 75% (Great Britain, 1982, S.132); this brought the marginal tax rate up to 
91.6 % (66.4 % from non-PRT-paying fields). 
 
It is clear that, with the steady upward escalation of the marginal tax rate from the 
12.5% royalty charge in 1964 to the 91.6% total in 1982 (see Figure 1), the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime appears to have been following the proprietorial model of 
governance. The introduction of new taxes and the repeated raising of existing tax rates 
during this period are consistent with the character of a proprietorial regime, the aim of 
these increases in the petroleum tax burden being to capture a larger share of the 
revenues from petroleum wealth for the UK Government and its citizens.    
 
However, when the marginal tax rate reached 91.6%, the Government recognised that 
exploration and development activities were being affected by the tax regime; it 
concluded that the further development of North Sea oil was being put at risk by the 
high marginal tax rate and the frequency of changes. On 31st December, 1982, SPD 
was replaced by another tax called Advanced Petroleum Revenue Tax (APRT). These 
tax reforms brought the marginal tax rate down to 89.5% (58% for non-PRT-paying 
fields).  
 
When the number of new oil and gas projects being proposed by the industry started to 
show a significant decline, changes were made to the UK petroleum fiscal regime in 
order to encourage exploration and development activities (Abdo, 2009; 2010b). In 
1983, royalties were abolished under the Petroleum Royalties (Relief) Act 1983 for 
qualifying fields receiving development approval from the Secretary of State for Energy 
 12 
 
on or after 1st April, 1982 (Great Britain, 1983). Following this change, new fields (that 
is, those developed between 1st April, 1982 and March 1993) were subject to a tax rate 
of 89.5% (58 % for non-PRT-paying fields) against the 88% rate levied upon old fields. 
The RFCT rate was reduced in this year to 50%, making the marginal tax rate 89.062% 
for old fields and 87.5% for new fields. The removal of royalties for new fields might 
be considered a sign that the regime had become non-proprietorial, because royalties 
represent payments towards customary ground rent. However, it should be remembered 
that fields developed before April 1982 (the old fields) were still subject to this duty; in 
other words, this non-proprietorial-type measure was not applied to the UK petroleum 
fiscal regime as a whole. 
 
The rate of the RFCT was further reduced to 45% in 1984, 40% in 1985 and to 35% in 
1986 (Great Britain, 1985; 1986), and these changes brought the petroleum marginal 
tax rate down to 87.97% (86.25 % in new fields), 86.87% (85 % in new fields), and to 
85.78% (83.75% in new fields) respectively. Again, although petroleum marginal tax 
rates were reduced, it does not follow that the reductions in the RFCT rate signalled the 
adoption of a non-proprietorial governance regime for the UK`s petroleum resources, 
since this tax is not a special petroleum tax but is paid by corporations across the UK. 
 
The Finance Act 1987 also introduced the concept of the “Cross Field Allowance”. This 
concept allowed 10% of the development expenditure of offshore fields outside the 
Southern Basin of the North Sea and approved for development after 17th March 1987, 
to be deducted from the income of other fields for the purpose of calculating PRT (Great 
Britain, 1987, S. 65). The Chancellor of the Exchequer also announced in the 1988 
Budget that all Southern Basin and onshore fields granted a development permit after 
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31st March, 1982 would be exempted from royalties with effect from 1st July, 1988 
(Great Britain, 1989; DOE, 1988; Bland, 1991). These fiscal changes in 1987 and 1988 
were both signs of a non-proprietorial philosophy, since they reduced the tax burden on 
oil companies.  
 
In 1990, the RFCT rate was lowered to 34%, bringing the marginal petroleum tax rate 
to 85.56% for old fields and 83.5% for fields developed after March 1982. The RFCT 
rate was further reduced to 33% in 1991; this lowered the petroleum marginal tax rate 
to 85.34% for old fields and 83.25% for new fields.  
 
Another significant petroleum tax relaxation came about in 1993; PRT was abolished 
for oil fields where development consent was given on or after 16th March, 1993 (Great 
Britain, 1993, S. 185).  This tax reform made the newest fields, i.e., those with 
development consents given after 16th March 1993, subject only to RFCT at a rate of 
33%. The rate of PRT was reduced for oil fields that had development consent before 
16th March from 75% to 50%. This tax reform brought the marginal tax rate for old 
fields to 70.69% and that for fields developed post March 1982 but pre March 1993 to 
66.5% (41.4% for non-PRT-paying fields), while fields developed post March 1993 
were subject to a marginal tax rate of 33%, which was the RFCT rate at the time. These 
tax reductions are the clearest signs that non-proprietorial governance was now in place 
for the UK`s petroleum resources, particularly for fields developed post March 1993. 
Oil companies extracted the UK`s non-renewable oil and gas resources from the post 
March 1993 fields without paying any petroleum tax – as if these resources were 
nature`s free gift to them.   
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The RFCT rate was reduced in 1997 to 31%; this pulled the petroleum marginal tax 
rates for the three different areas of the UKCS down to 69.81% for old fields, 65.5% 
for fields developed post March 1982 but pre March 1993, and 31% for fields developed 
post March 1993. In 1999, the RFCT rate was lowered to 30%, reducing the marginal 
tax rates to 69.38% for old fields, 65% for fields developed post March 1982 but pre 
March 1993, and 30% for fields developed post March 1993. 
 
As can be seen from the above account, the tax regime which applied to any particular 
oil and gas field depended on when it received development approval. Depending on 
the age of the field and its tax state, the marginal rate of tax ranged from 69.4% to 30%. 
If a field was liable for royalties, PRT and RFCT, then the marginal tax rate would be 
69.4%. If the field was liable for PRT and RFCT alone, then the marginal tax rate would 
be 65%. Finally, the marginal tax rate would be 30% for fields that were liable for 
RFCT only (DTI, 2001, S. 3.28). The changes to the petroleum tax regime were initially 
intended to simplify the regime, as well as making the UK an attractive investment 
province for international oil and gas companies and former  Prime Minister Tony Blair 
asserted that the UK oil industry enjoyed an “enormously favourable tax regime” 
(Corzine, 1998: 16). 
 
The evolution of the UK petroleum fiscal regime between 1983 and 2000, illustrated in 
figure 1, clearly demonstrates that the UK`s governance of its mineral resources 
underwent a significant change during this period. The Government loosened the 
taxation burden on oil and gas companies in order to attract more oil and gas investment 
and hence, in the long term, collect more revenues. Previous studies have however 
shown that the Government was not successful in meeting these objectives (Abdo, 
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2010a; Rutledge and Wright, 2010). By intervening in the oil business and relaxing the 
UK petroleum fiscal regime over the period 1983-2000, the Government was 
attempting to implement a non-proprietorial regime, but this attempt did not result in 
the expected win-win situation for the UK Government and the oil and gas industry. 
The consequences of the application of the non-proprietorial regime were increased 
profits and an enhanced cash flow for oil companies at the expense of the UK 
Government and its citizens. Since 2000, however, a number of tax changes have 
occurred which reflect a change in the Government`s approach to mineral resource 
governance.  
 
3.2. The Period 2000-2010 
Since 2000, UK petroleum tax regime has again witnessed significant change with the 
introduction of a new petroleum tax, the rate of which has subsequently been raised 
twice. There are a number of possible explanations for this change in taxation policy: 
it may be put down to the dramatic increase in oil prices post 2000 (Rutledge and 
Wright, 2010); or it could be that the Government had realised that the type of mineral 
governance applied to oil and gas needed to be reviewed and possibly changed; or it 
could be a combination of the two.  
 
A major tax change to the North Sea regime came about in 2002 when the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer announced on 17th April that companies producing oil and gas in the 
UK or on the UKCS would pay a SC of 10% on their profits from ring-fenced trading 
on top of the 30% Corporation Tax already payable on these profits. Companies paid 
the SC on ring-fenced profits at the same time as their general Corporation Tax, and 
there were special rules for instalment payments to cover the transitional period (i.e. 
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the accounting period that included Budget day).  These special rules ensured that no 
underpayment of instalments would arise by virtue of the introduction of the SC 
(HMRC, 2010). Also in this year the Budget introduced 100% First Year Capital 
Allowances to be available for virtually all ring-fenced capital expenditure. This 
allowance was clearly aimed at stimulating oil investment in the UK North Sea. In the 
same Budget the Chancellor announced his intention to abolish the royalty charge 
completely (Great Britain, 2002). With the introduction of the SC, the marginal tax rate 
of the three areas of the UKCS changed to become 73.75% for old fields, 70% for fields 
developed post March 1982 but pre March 1993, and 40% for post March 1993 fields. 
 
Royalty was abolished with effect from 1st January, 2003. This in turn changed the 
marginal tax rate for fields developed before March 1982 to 70%, while fields 
developed after March 1982 were not affected since these fields were not subject to 
royalty charges (HMRC, 2010). The interesting point about this reform is that it 
simplified the UK oil and gas fiscal regime: all those fields developed prior to March 
1993 became subject to the same marginal tax rate from January 2003 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 
 
Source: based on data extracted from HMRC. 
 
The rate of the SC was raised to 20% with effect from 1st January, 2006 (HMRC, 
2010b). This increase in the SC rate increased the marginal tax rate for the two 
categories of fields in the UKCS to 75% for any field developed pre March 1993, and 
to 50% for fields developed post March 1993. A further increase in the rate of the SC 
– to 32% – came in the Finance Bill of 2011, taking effect from 24th March, 2011 
(DECC, 2011). This increase in the SC rate increased the marginal tax rates to 81% for 
fields developed pre March 1993, and to 62% for posts March 1993 fields. 
 
These changes have made the UK petroleum fiscal regime tougher, and the debate about 
whether they have de-incentivised investment in the UKCS has already started; see, for 
example, Muslumov (2011) and Pfeifer et al. (2011). Since January 2003 the UK`s oil 
and gas resources have been extracted under a concession system. As the royalty charge 
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no longer exists, however, the UK cannot be described as a royalty/tax country, even 
though it uses the concession type of oil and gas agreements. In 2009, the Government 
introduced a Field Allowance to encourage investment in small or technically 
challenging fields. This allowance was set at £75 million for small fields and £800 
million for ultra-heavy oil fields and ultra-high pressure/high temperature fields. The 
Government believes that the introduction of this allowance will help unlock two billion 
barrels of the UK`s remaining oil and gas reserves, making a significant contribution to 
the supply side of UK energy security (HMRC, 2009). 
 
Since 2000 the Government has harmonised the tax treatment of fields developed pre 
March 1993 while at the same time increasing the tax burden on oil and gas investments 
in the UKCS. This suggests that the current and future governance of petroleum 
resources is shifting back from a non-proprietorial to a proprietorial regime. The 
Government may have realised that the previous interventionist approach in the oil and 
gas business between 1983 and 2000 was imperfect; it brought in no increased 
investment and did not create the anticipated win-win scenario. Having realised that 
production from existing resources had peaked and that output was showing a 
downward trend, the Government appears to have decided that a change in governance 
was necessary if more tax revenues were to be secured from British petroleum 
resources. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
Prior to 2000, the index of tax revenues fell very steeply and its relationship to both 
production and prices fundamentally changed. The changes may be broadly 
characterised as a disassociation between taxation and both production and prices 
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between 1986 and 1991, followed by a disassociation between taxation and production 
between 1991 and 2000. These changes can be illustrated by looking at the UK 
Government’s tax take in relation to production in the years 1986, 1993 and 1999 (see 
Table 1). In 1986 the oil price was $14/barrel, oil and gas production was 165.6 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) and tax revenues were £4.8 billion. In 1993 the oil price 
was $17/barrel, oil and gas production was 160.1 mtoe and tax revenues were just £1.3 
billion. In 1999 the oil price was $18/barrel and production of 227.9 mtoe was 
associated with revenues of £2.6 billion. In other words, production in 1999 was 38% 
greater than it was in 1986, but revenues were 46% less in money-of-the-day 
(considerably less in real terms) even though the oil price was higher. Thus, the UK 
Government and UK citizens forfeited significant windfalls, without a commensurate 
response from companies in terms of increased investment, particularly as a result of 
the adoption of a non-proprietorial regime during that period (Abdo, 2010a).   
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Table 1:  
Year
Production of 
Liquids 
(Crude Oil + 
NGLs) (Mt)
Production of 
Gas (Mtoe) 
Production 
of Oil and 
Gas (Mtoe) 
Brent Crude 
Price ($/bbl)
Total North 
Sea Tax 
Revenues 
(£million)
of which 
Petroleum 
Revenue Tax
1980 80.5 33.1 113.6 36.8 3,963 2,410
1981 89.5 32.8 122.3 35.9 6,506 2,390
1982 103.2 32.9 136.1 33.0 7,868 3,274
1983 114.9 33.3 148.2 29.6 8,817 6,017
1984 125.1 32.9 158.0 28.8 12,171 7,177
1985 127.6 36.5 164.1 27.6 11,371 6,375
1986 127.1 38.5 165.6 14.4 4,804 1,188
1987 123.4 40.5 163.9 18.4 4,645 2,296
1988 114.5 38.7 153.2 14.9 3,193 1,371
1989 91.7 38.3 130.0 18.2 2,401 1,050
1990 91.6 42.3 133.9 23.7 2,343 860
1991 91.3 47.1 138.4 20.0 1,016 -216
1992 94.3 48.1 142.4 19.3 1,338 69
1993 100.2 60.1 160.3 17.0 1,266 359
1994 126.9 59.5 186.5 15.82 1,683 712
1995 130.3 64.8 195.1 17.02 2,338 968
1996 130.0 77.6 207.6 20.67 3,351 1,729
1997 128.2 79.0 207.2 19.09 3,331 963
1998 132.6 81.9 214.5 12.72 2,514 504
1999 137.1 90.8 227.9 17.97 2,563 853
2000 126.2 99.6 225.8 28.50 4,457 1,521
UK Petroleum Production, Prices and Tax Revenues
Source: DECC, various years, Oil and Gas Information  
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Table 1 and Figure 1 above show that the UK petroleum fiscal regime was gradually 
being tightened until the early 1980s when it was relaxed - no new taxes were 
introduced until 2002. The relaxations considerably reduced both the Government`s 
marginal tax take and its economic rent from petroleum resources. This lead to UK 
petroleum tax relaxation being described as being ‘weak’ and evidently governed by a 
non-proprietorial regime (Rutledge and Wright, 1998). 
 
However, since 2000 the Government appears to have changed its approach to the 
governance of petroleum resources and taken steps to capture a greater share of 
resources for the state. This was illustrated by the introduction of the SC in 2002 and 
the increases in the rate of SC in 2006 and again in 2011.  
 
A simple investigation into the post 2000 petroleum tax changes leads to some 
interesting observations. The introduction of the SC in 2002 at a rate of 10% increased 
the marginal tax rate for old fields by 3.06 percentage points (6.1 percentage points for 
non-PRT-paying fields), and for fields developed post March 1982 but pre March 1993 
it increased the rate by 3.5 percentage points. The abolition of royalty in 2003 benefited 
the old fields by 3.75 percentage points (7.5 percentage points for non-PRT-paying 
fields) but had no effect on post March 1982 fields since these were already exempted 
from paying this duty. The overall effect of the two tax reforms on the old fields was a 
benefit of 0.69 percentage points (1.4 percentage points for non-PRT-paying fields), 
while post 1982 fields experienced a loss of 3.5 percentage points.v In other words, the 
two reforms had different effects on these two categories of fields; there is as yet no 
clear indication of a change in the governance of petroleum resources in the UK, at least 
as far as old fields are concerned.    
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The story is different, however, when we look closely at the changes implemented since 
2006. The increase in the SC rate from 10% to 20% had the greatest effect on non-PRT-
paying fields. Whilst the marginal tax take from fields developed both pre and post 
March 1982 increased by 5 percentage points (from 70% to 75%), the marginal tax take 
from non-PRT-paying fields rose by 10 percentage points (from 40% to 50%). And, 
after the 2011 tax change, while the marginal tax take from PRT-paying fields increased 
by 6 percentage points (from 75% to 81%), it rose by 12 percentage points from non-
PRT-paying fields (from 50% to 62%).  
 
Thus, changes to the UK petroleum fiscal regime since 2000, including the royalty and 
SC reforms, have had the greatest effect on non-PRT-paying fields. While the overall 
effect of the tax changes on old fields has been to increase the marginal tax rate of these 
fields by 11.63 percentage points, and fields developed post March 1982 have seen their 
marginal tax rate go up by 13 percentage points, non-PRT-paying fields have been 
subject to a 23.5 percentage point increase. This suggests that the Government has 
decided to capture more tax revenues from the non-PRT-paying fields – possibly 
because these fields previously benefited from PRT exemption.  
 
Although the Government removed the royalty charge completely in 2003, the marginal 
tax take for every field in the UKCS increased as a result of the SC rate increases in 
2006 and 2011. This is a clear sign that the Government was attempting to retighten the 
UK`s petroleum fiscal regime in line with a proprietorial type of mineral resource 
governance. 
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As can be seen from Figure 1, changes in marginal tax rates mirror changes in oil prices, 
and the later (i.e. the changes in oil prices) mirrors changes in total UK tax revenues 
from the UKCS. But has the Government`s introduction of the SC, and the subsequent 
increases in its rate, succeeded in capturing more tax revenues? Or has the increase in 
the Government tax take actually been driven by the rise in oil prices since 2000? The 
answers to these questions should give a clearer idea of whether the introduction , and 
subsequent increase in the SC, reflects a change in the nature of the UK`s governance 
of its petroleum resources from non-proprietorial to proprietorial.  
4.1. Increase in Tax Rates or in Oil Prices? 
Table 2 shows that tax revenues from the UKCS, notwithstanding short term 
fluctuations, have grown steadily since 2000. A closer look at the figures in the table 
shows that this increase has not been driven by an increase in oil and gas production.  
In fact, oil and gas production declined over the period 2000-10. The increase in tax 
revenues can be related directly to either the increase in oil prices, tax rates or to both. 
For example, in 2004 oil and gas production decreased to 194 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (mtoe) from 213 mtoe in 2003, but tax revenues from the UKCS increased 
to £5,172 million (£m) in 2004 from £4,281m in 2003. This increase in tax revenues 
can be linked to the increase in oil prices from $28.83/barrel in 2003 to $38.04/barrel 
in 2004. The increase in tax revenues is not directly related to the introduction of SC in 
2002 because, as demonstrated above, old fields were better off by 0.69 percentage 
points and the effect on non-PRT-paying fields was insignificant. 
 
Going back to 2003, it can be seen that tax revenues declined to £4,281m from £5,117m  
in 2002. This reduction is the result of abolition of the royalty in that year, the effect of 
implementing the 100% capital allowance in 2002 and a reduction in oil and gas 
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production; oil prices did not rise significantly in this period. It can also be seen from 
table 2 that the tax revenues from the UKCS materially increased after 2006. This is 
attributable to two main factors: the 2006 increase in the SC rate to 20% and the 
dramatic increase in oil prices, particularly in 2008. 
 
The growth in tax revenues from the UKCS is mainly attributable to increasing oil 
prices rather than the increase in the petroleum marginal tax rate. Fields developed 
before March 1993 saw their marginal tax rate rise by 5 percentage points, while new 
fields faced an increase of 10 percentage points. However, as new fields tend to be 
smaller than old ones, the net effect of this change was minimal. Thus, the increase in 
tax take can be said to have been driven primarily by the rise in oil prices. Had oil prices 
remained constant, we could have expected to see tax revenues go down as oil and gas 
production declined from year to year. Even if production remained constant, tax 
revenues would not have increased without an increase in the tax rate. In the UK, such 
increases happened in 2002, 2006 and 2011. The effect of the 2011 tax rate increase is 
yet to be felt, but the effects of the 2002 and 2006 increases were evident in the higher 
tax revenues generated in 2003 and 2007. It is therefore reasonable to assume that any 
other increase in tax revenues must be a result of changes in oil prices. 
 
Closer examination of the figures for 2008 and 2009 in Table 2 would support this view. 
Marginal tax take did not change between these two years, production declined by 
almost 10%, tax revenues declined by about 49%, and oil prices declined by about 36%. 
Since the year 2000, changes in oil prices have had the greatest impact on UK petroleum 
tax revenues compared to other factors such as increased tax rates. In other words, the 
tax tool associated with the UK Government`s interventionist approach has not been 
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entirely successful in changing the governance of the UK`s petroleum resources from 
the non-proprietorial to the proprietorial model.   
Table 2 
Tax Revenues, Oil and Gas Production and Brent Oil Prices 
Year 
Licence 
Fee  
£M 
Royalty    
£M 
Petroleum 
Revenue 
Tax         
£M 
Corporation 
Tax           
£M 
Supplementary 
Charge           
£M 
Total Tax 
Revenues   
£M 
Total UKCS 
Oil & NG 
production 
mtoe 
Oil 
Prices  
$barrel 
1999  53  389  853  1268  0  2563  244  17.97 
2000  55  552  1521  2329  0  4457  241  28.5 
2001  59  548  1307  3515  0  5429  227  24.44 
2002  63  434  958  3392  270  5117  224  25.02 
2003  58  ‐13  1179  2317  740  4281  213  28.83 
2004  57  0  1284  2841  990  5172  194  38.04 
2005  57  0  2016  5427  1880  9380  175  54.52 
2006  57  0  2155  3959  2750  8921  158  65.14 
2007  55  0  1680  3378  2350  7463  150  72.39 
2008  65  0  2567  6108  4250  12990  143  97.26 
2009  66  0  923  3288  2280  6557  129  61.67 
2010  66  0  1450  4530  3150  9196  121  79.61 
Source: Tax revenues and production data from the DECC 2011, oil prices from BP Statistical Review 2010 
 
But the key question here is how far the Government`s petroleum tax revenues have 
been increased as a result of the post 2000 tax changes. The analysis began with the 
calculation of the tax paid per tonne of oil equivalent and the tax per tonne of oil 
equivalent as a percentage of the oil price. These calculations are presented in Table 3 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
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UKCS Totals of Tax Revenues, Oil and Gas Production, Tax Per Tonne of Oil Equivalent, Oil 
Price per Tonne and Tax to Oil Price Ratio 
Year 
Total Tax 
Revenues from 
UKCS £M 
Oil and Gas 
Production from 
UKCS mtoe 
Tax per toe 
£ 
Oil Price  
£tonne  Tax to Oil Price % 
2000  4457  241  18.49  138.1  13.39 
2001  5429  227  23.92  125.7  19.03 
2002  5117  224  22.84  123  18.57 
2003  4281  213  20.10  130  15.46 
2004  5172  194  26.66  154  17.31 
2005  9380  175  53.60  214.4  25.00 
2006  8921  158  56.46  257.5  21.93 
2007  7463  150  49.75  269.8  18.44 
2008  12990  143  90.84  379.8  23.92 
2009  6557  129  50.83  240.5  21.14 
2010  9196  121  76.00  310.47  24.48 
Source: DECC 2011 
 
This table shows that the tax per tonne of oil climbed steadily over the period 2000-
2010. In 2008 the tax per tonne of oil was more than four times higher than in 2000 and 
2002. The tax paid per tonne of oil in 2009, although lower than the 2008 level, was 
still about double the 2004 level. This suggests that the Government tax take has 
dramatically increased since 2000. Examination of the tax to oil price ratio column 
reveals that the Government has increased its tax take per tonne of oil as a percentage 
of oil price, though not by much. For example, in 2001 the tax to price ratio was 19.03%, 
while the highest rate, 24.48%, was achieved in 2010; it must be remembered, however, 
that in 2001 the SC had not yet been introduced, and that oil prices in 2010 were more 
than double what they were in 2001. From this analysis we can state that the UK 
Government has managed to increase its tax take from its oil and gas resources, but not 
by a significant amount. This conclusion suggests that, as part of a proprietorial regime, 
the tax tool has been effective to some extent in increasing the total UK tax take from 
its petroleum resources since 2000.  
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Table 3 shows that oil and gas production from the UKCS declined over the period 
2000-2010. It might be argued that this decrease is the consequence of reduced 
investment in oil and gas in the UKCS, and that this is directly attributable to the 
increase in petroleum marginal tax rates. Is this really the case? This is discussed in the 
next section. 
 
4.2. Oil and Gas Investments in the UKCS 
After 40 years of investment in the UK oil and gas industry, UKCS production is now 
declining. Future investment activities will be determined by three key factors: geology, 
availability of finance and future oil prices. Because of the decline in production and 
the slowdown in oil and gas investments, the UKCS has been described as a mature 
petroleum province. This description conveys a number of characteristics: 1) the 
average size of newly discovered wells is getting smaller; 2) production rates are 
falling;vi 3) interest in exploration and development is declining;  and 4) new reserves 
are insufficient to replace the depleted quantities in existing reserves (Kemp and 
Stephen, in Glomsrød and Osmundsen, 2005; DTI, 2006). 
 
But is the increase in the marginal tax rate entirely to blame for the decline in oil and 
gas investment in the UKCS since 2000? There are in fact a number of reasons why oil 
companies might shy away from investing in the UKCS: 1) the new discoveries are 
getting smaller; vii 2) larger and more profitable discoveries are known to exist 
elsewhere in the world, for example Arabia and the Gulf of Mexico; 3) the cost of 
investing in the UK North Sea has risen;viii 4) oil and gas production from the UKCS 
has already peaked and the remaining oil and gas reserves are decliningix (see Figure 
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2); and 5) the UK petroleum fiscal regime is perceived as unstable and uncertain, given 
the many changes it has undergone since the mid-1970s.  
  Figure 2
    
  Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS): Oil and Gas Reserves, UK. 
 
It is true that the UKCS is now a mature petroleum province, since less oil and gas is 
being produced from an increased number of oil and gas wells. This means that the new 
oil and gas fields are smaller in terms of the reserves and production capacity compared 
to old fields such as Brent. It is a fact in the oil and gas industry that the smaller the oil 
field, the less profitable it is. Table 4 depicts the above. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
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Drilling Activities, Capital Expenditure and  Oil and Gas Fields in Operation in the UKCS 
Year 
Total Number of Offshore 
and Onshore Drilling Wells  Capital Expenditure £M 
Number of Oil and Gas 
Fields in Operation 
Exploration 
& Appraisal  Development 
Exploration 
& Appraisal  Development  Total 
Oil and Gas 
Fields in 
Production 
Oil and Gas 
Fields under 
Development 
2000  75  236  348  2,750  3,098  221  13 
2001  67  312  420  3,570  3,990  239  22 
2002  59  278  389  3,598  3,988  248  12 
2003  49  224  334  3,412  3,746  259  84 
2004  67  181  396  3,302  3,698  264  23 
2005  84  249  460  4,371  4,831  277  19 
2006  85  214  773  5,656  6,429  283  24 
2007  126  180  1,090  5,303  6,393  300  17 
2008  125  190  1,274  4,780  6,054  318  12 
2009  79  142  na   na   na   317  10 
2010  71  142  na   na    na   na  na 
Source: DECC, 2011 
Note: figures for exploration and appraisal and development wells for 2009 and 2010 are not 
yet available from the DECC; the same applies to the number of oil and gas fields in operation 
in 2010. 
 
This can be seen from Tables 3 and 4. Whilst the number of oil and gas fields in 
operation has been increasing since 2000, oil and gas production has been in continuous 
decline. Looking at Table 4 in conjunction with Figure 2, we can assume that the 
declining oil and gas reserves in the ground, the small size of new discoveries and 
higher extraction costs are the main reasons for declining capital expenditure in the 
UKCS. Added to this are the promising opportunities open to oil and gas companies in 
other parts of the world and the uncertainty of the UK petroleum fiscal regime. Taking 
all this into account, it can be argued that the post 2000 increases in the UK petroleum 
marginal tax rates are not the major cause of declining investment in the UKCS.  
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Conclusion 
The UK petroleum fiscal regime has been subject to many changes since its 
establishment in 1975, both in its structure and tax rates. While pre 1983 fiscal changes 
saw consistent increase in marginal tax rates, this trend was reversed between 1983 and 
2002, and then reversed again from 2002 onward. These shifts reflect the UK 
Government`s movement back and forth between two different types of mineral 
resource governance – what Mommer (2002) called proprietorial and non-proprietorial 
regimes. 
 
In the early 1980s the UK Government appears to have believed that adopting a 
proprietorial regime would lead to a slowdown in oil and gas investments in the UKCS. 
Therefore, the Government decided to take an interventionist approach in the oil and 
gas business in the UKCS, relaxing the petroleum fiscal regime a number of times. The 
Government’s rationale at the time was that relaxing the oil and gas taxation system 
would bring more investment into the UK North Sea and this would drive more oil and 
gas production and hence more tax revenues; in other words, adopting the non-
proprietorial type of governance would result in a win-win scenario. 
 
But the evidence for the period from 1993 to 2002 appears to indicate that this did not 
happen, and that what had actually happened was that while oil and gas companies 
enjoyed windfall profits and enhanced their cash flow as a result of the three tax 
relaxations, the UK Government lost tax revenues (Abdo, 2006; 2009; 2010a). This 
may have been a key reason why UK petroleum tax policy makers decided to change 
the governance model for the country`s mineral resources and move back towards a 
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proprietorial regime, while assuming that market forces would bring the required 
balance to the relationship between oil companies and the Government.  
 
Under the non-proprietorial regime of the early 1980s, the Government seems to have 
encouraged the rapid depletion of the UK North Sea oil and gas resources, albeit for 
some understandable reasons. Self-sufficiency in oil and gas was a key driver, as was 
the increasing involvement of downstream UK companies in supplying offshore capital 
equipment. The UK achieved self-sufficiency in oil in 1980 and in gas in 1995, but this 
did not last long; self-sufficiency in gas was lost in 2004 and in oil in 2006. With the 
maturing of the UK North Sea oil and gas business, the policy objective seems to have 
changed to favour collecting higher revenues from the remaining UK petroleum 
resources. These revenues, if not used to reduce income tax for British citizens, were to 
be used for extra public spending, or to cut the current financial deficit. If this is still 
the Government`s intention, a proprietorial type of governance model for UK petroleum 
resources needs to be in place over the next few years.    
 
The rationale behind the UK petroleum tax relaxations in the period 1980-2000 has 
already been investigated, and the results show that in most cases the policy objectives 
were not met; success was very limited. The adoption of the non-proprietorial regime 
between 1983 and 2002 cost the UK Government significant fiscal revenues. Mommer 
(2002: 235) has warned that “There remains a possibility that non-proprietorial 
governance will not prosper beyond the early advances it has already made in some 
exporting countries. A few years will probably be enough to show the heavy losses in 
fiscal revenues that non-proprietorial governance will entail for the exporting countries. 
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Lessons may be learned in the future, but at what price?” In the UK`s case, the lesson 
seems to have been revenue costly for both the Government and its citizens. 
 
In order to evaluate the success of UK petroleum taxation policy post 2000, further 
investigation now needs to be conducted into the rationales for the post 2000 petroleum 
tax changes; this will be our next research.    
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End Notes  
i From an international perspective, the UK is the second largest European oil and gas producer, after 
Norway. Worldwide, the UK is the 15th largest gas producer and the 19th largest oil producer (Oil and 
Gas UK, 2010b: 9). 
 
ii These fields are protected from paying PRT by the “safeguard concept”. This concept states that PRT 
payable by a participator in an oil and gas field for any chargeable period should not exceed 80% of the 
gross profit of that field, and that it should be levied only if his adjusted profit for that period exceeds 
15% of his accumulated capital expenditure at the end of that period (Great Britain 1975, S. 9). Another 
category of non-PRT-paying fields were those exempted from paying PRT by the 1993 Finance Act, i.e. 
fields developed post March 1993; the Government calls these “non-taxable fields” (Great Britain, 1993, 
S. 185). Any PRT-exempted field is referred to in this paper as a “non-PRT-paying field”. 
 
iii Major changes to the petroleum fiscal regime over the period 1975-1983 were: the Oil Taxation Act 
1975, provisions contained in seven Finance Acts and the Petroleum Revenue Tax Act 1980. 
 
iv The marginal tax rate of 89.9% is calculated as follows: royalty = 100 x 12.5% = 12.5; PRT = (100 – 
12.5) x 70% = 61.25; SPD = (100 – 12.5 – 61.25) x 20% = 5.25; CT = (100 – 12.5 – 61.25 – 5.25) x 52% 
= 10.92. Marginal tax rate = 12.5 + 61.25 + 5.25 + 10.92 = 89.92%. 
 
v These have been calculated as follows: Old fields were subject to an increase of 3.06 percentage 
points because of the SC and these fields benefited by 3.75 percentage points from the abolition of 
royalties; the overall result was a benefit of 3.75 – 3.06 = 0.69 percentage points less on the marginal 
tax rate of these fields. Non-PRT paying fields (7.5 – 6.10 = 1.4 percentage points benefit. Post March 
1993 fields were subject to an increase in their marginal tax rate by 3.5 percentage points. 
 
vi The average daily production in 2010 was 13,000 barrels of oil equivalent compared with 47,000 boe 
in 1990 (Oil and Gas UK, 2010: 24). 
 
vii With the maturity of the UKCS, new discoveries are typically one tenth to one hundredth of the size 
of the fields found in the early days of exploration in British waters. The average size of fields 
discovered over the last decade is around 26 million boe, with two thirds of all discoveries less than 15 
million boe (Oil and Gas UK, 2010: 24). 
 
viii Development and operating costs per barrel have more than doubled between 2001 and 2010. Such 
increases were already restraining new investment, even when oil and gas prices were rising steadily. 
Also, the Oil and Gas UK (2010: 26) states “the fall in oil and gas prices during 2008-9, after a period 
of rapid cost inflation, reduced operating margins. As a result the industry sought to reduce its cost 
structure and to focus on operational efficiency and extracting value from its assets. This lead to a 
reduction in total operating expenditure of 5% to around 6.6 billion in 2009”. 
  
ix Although UK oil and gas production has already peaked, the UK remains a substantial world 
producer today. In 2009, the UK was the 19th largest oil producer and the 15th largest gas producer (Oil 
and Gas UK, 2010: 9).  
 
 
                                                 
